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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the pricing of conservative accounting and introduces a new measure 
of conservatism. We contribute to the conservatism literature in two main ways. First, we 
analyze the nonlinear pricing of conservatism using the return decomposition model of 
Vuolteenaho (2002) and investigate the pricing implications of special items which are 
one of the main accrual items through which conservatism is facilitated. Our conceptual 
analysis implies – and our empirical results show - that the asymmetric properties of 
conservative accounting and the existence of alternative non-accounting sources of 
information generate a nonlinear relation between the unexpected revision in equity 
returns and earnings news, which is defined as the shock to current and future cash flows. 
Underlying this nonlinearity pricing result is the assumption that equity markets learn 
about shocks to firm cash flows from non-accounting as well as accounting sources. In 
addition, the analysis implies that the GAAP treatment of special items generates a 
nonlinear and discontinuous relation between unexpected revisions in equity returns and 
special items. Second, based on this model, we construct a conservatism ratio (CR) at the 
firm-year level that is a function of contemporaneous good/bad news. CR is defined as 
the ratio of the current earnings shock to total earnings news and measures how much of 
the total shock to expected future earnings is recognized in current year earnings. We 
show empirically that CR incorporates bad news faster than good news at the firm and 
year level, consistent with conservative accounting. 
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 1.  Introduction 
 
This paper analyzes the pricing of conservative accounting and introduces a new 
measure of conservatism at the firm-year level. We contribute to the conservatism 
literature in two main ways. First, we analyze the nonlinear pricing of conservatism using 
the return decomposition model of Vuolteenaho (2002), focusing primarily but not 
exclusively on the pricing of special items, one of the major accrual items through which 
conservatism is facilitated. Our conceptual analysis implies – and our empirical results 
show – that the asymmetric properties of conservative accounting generate a nonlinear 
(convex) relation between the unexpected revision in equity returns and earnings news. 
Earnings news is the conceptually correct measure of an earnings surprise and is defined 
as the shock to the discounted sum of expected current and future earnings over the 
lifetime of the firm. In other words, earnings news is the conventional current earnings 
surprise plus the surprise to future earnings (appropriately discounted). Underlying this 
nonlinearity pricing result, as we shall see, is the very reasonable assumption that equity 
markets learn about shocks to firm earnings (cash flows) from non-accounting as well as 
accounting sources. In addition, the analysis implies that the GAAP treatment of special 
items generates a nonlinear and discontinuous (quasi-convex) relation between 
unexpected revisions in equity returns and special items irrespective of the news source. 
Second, based on the Vuolteenaho (2002) model, we construct a conservatism ratio (CR) 
at the firm-year level that can be used to measure the asymmetry between gain and loss 
recognition timeliness. Specifically, CR is computed as the ratio of the current earnings 
surprise to earnings news. Hence, CR shows how much of the total shock to current and 
expected future earnings (cash flows) is recognized in current year earnings. By this 
criterion, firm A is more conservative than firm B at time t if A’s conservatism ratio is 
greater (less) than B’s conservatism ratio for a given negative (positive) earnings shock 
measured at time t.1
Although our approach is in the spirit of Basu (1997), the structure of the 
Vuolteenaho (2002) model necessitates a different analysis along a number of 
                                                 
1 Hence, CR is a meaningful measure of conservatism only if conditioned on the sign of the earnings shock.  
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dimensions. First, good and bad news in the model are defined in terms of shocks 
(revisions) to returns and not return levels. This shock definition accords with intuition. 
Suppose that returns are expected to be 15% and, because of a new information shock, 
returns expectations are revised downwards to 5%. This is surely bad news despite the 
fact that returns are positive.2 Second, the model shows that shocks to returns are not 
merely a function of the conventionally measured earnings surprise but rather are a 
function inter alia of earnings news.3 Specifically, unless shocks to current earnings are 
completely transitory, they affect expectations of future earnings as well. Therefore, the 
impact of good and bad news on current earnings, or even on the conventional earnings 
surprise, is an insufficient metric of conservative accounting absent controls for the 
impact of the good/bad news on future earnings.4 Third, the model explicitly controls for 
shocks to time-varying expected discount rates (expected return news). This issue is 
potentially important because, as shown by Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997, p. 265), 
among others, small changes in expected discount rates can have a large impact on 
security returns, especially when expected returns are persistent.  
The empirical results are consistent with the implications of the conceptual 
analysis. In particular, we find that the hypothesized nonlinear relation between the 
revision in equity returns and earnings news is highly significant and increasing convex 
as predicted. We further find that the (positive) association between negative earnings 
news and special items is significant and larger than the (positive) association between 
positive earnings news and special items. We also find that the nonlinear relation between 
the revision in equity returns and special items is increasing convex. Although we focus 
primarily on special items, a separate analysis indicates that the revision in equity returns 
is also a highly significant and increasing convex function of both the conventional 
                                                 
2 Positive (negative) raw returns are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for good (bad) news. Basu 
(1997), in a sensitivity analysis, subtracts total market returns from firm returns. However, this measure of 
unexpected returns is potentially misspecified because it fails to account for systematic risk.  
3 The conventional view of the earnings-return paradigm is that the current level of earnings provides 
information about expected future cash flows and, this in turn determines the current level of security 
returns. We do not contest this. However, the standard Basu-type analysis of conservative accounting 
focuses correctly on the asymmetry between “good” news and “bad” news events on equity valuation. 
Good news and bad news refer to revisions or equivalently to shocks, not levels. Thus, it is more useful to 
analyze conservative accounting with a revisions approach rather than a levels approach. Specifically, the 
perspective of this study is that revisions to current earnings provide information about revisions to 
expected future cash flows which, in turn, determines revisions to equity returns. 
4 In the absence of controls, there is a potential correlated omitted variables problem. 
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earnings surprise and the earnings level. However, the Vuolteenaho model yields 
differential timeliness values for the earnings level that are far smaller than those of Basu.  
Finally, we establish the properties of the new conservatism ratio (CR) for which 
the Vuolteenaho model provides the requisite inputs. We show empirically that CR 
incorporates bad news faster than good news at the firm-year level. More specifically, we 
demonstrate that when there is a negative shock to future cash flows, a greater proportion 
of the shock is incorporated into current period earnings than when there is a positive 
shock. This finding is consistent with the asymmetric timeliness of conservative 
accounting. We find that, on average, almost 60% of bad news is recognized in current 
earnings as opposed to only 47% of good news.  
In what follows, Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on conservatism and 
special items, and Section 3 presents the conceptual analysis. Section 4 describes the 
return decomposition model and the measure of earnings news. Section 5 describes the 
data and Section 6 provides the empirical results. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  Literature Review  
2.1 Conservatism5
Basu (1997) interprets conservatism as capturing accountants’ tendency to require 
a higher degree of verification for recognizing good news than bad news in financial 
statements (Basu 1997, p.4). Under this interpretation, earnings reflect bad news (e.g., 
unrealized losses) more quickly than good news (e.g., unrealized gains). Based on this 
interpretation, Basu (1997) predicts and finds strong evidence that reported earnings are 
timely in reflecting publicly available bad news compared to good news.6 The subsequent 
literature refers to the Basu measure of conservatism as “differential timeliness.”7
                                                 
5 Our review is limited to those papers that have direct bearing on our empirical modeling. In particular, we 
do not review papers on conservatism that are clearly of interest but not directly related to our approach 
such as Beaver and Ryan (2005) and Bagnoli and Watts (2005). Bagnoli and Watts (2005) develop a model 
in which conservative accounting choices potentially have pricing implications 
6 Specifically, Basu (1997) uses a reverse regression of price-deflated earnings on an indicator variable for 
negative stock returns (D), stock returns (R), and stock returns interacted with the indicator variable 
(subscripts omitted): EARN = a0 + a1D + ß0R + ß1R*D. He then tests for and finds the coefficient ß1 to be 
significantly positive. 
7 Some studies refer to differential timeliness as “earnings conservatism” or “conditional conservatism” as 
compared to “balance sheet conservatism” or “unconditional conservatism” (as reflected in the market-to-
book ratio) (e.g., Beaver and Ryan 2005; Pae et al. 2005). 
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A number of papers examine why conservatism is so ubiquitous. Watts (2003a) 
reviews several possible explanations. According to Watts (2003a), the main explanation 
for conservatism is contracting.8 Watts (2003a) argues that accounting conservatism 
efficiently constrains managers’ tendency for opportunistic behavior; managers with 
limited tenure have incentives to inflate reported income to increase their bonuses and the 
value of their stock options. However, accounting conservatism facilitates the use of 
earnings as a performance measure by deferring the recognition of gains until they are 
verifiable (Barclay,  Gode, and Kothari 2003).9 Conservatism is also valuable in debt 
contracts. Lenders want to protect themselves against excessive dividend payments and 
additional borrowing. Conservative accounting directly constrains dividend payouts 
based on earnings (and retained earnings). Conservatism further triggers write-offs of 
impaired assets and recognition of unrecorded liabilities, pushing the debt/equity ratio 
closer to its maximum limit and tightening the constraints on additional borrowing, 
offsetting managers’ incentives to overstate earnings, overstate assets, and understate 
liabilities (Pae, Thornton, and Welker 2005; Vasvari 2006). To sum up, timely 
incorporation of economic losses in financial statements increases the effectiveness of 
corporate governance, compensation systems, and debt agreements in motivating and 
monitoring managers (Ball 2001, p. 141).10
A number of studies have examined whether Basu’s measure of differential 
timeliness varies across countries with legal and other institutional factors (e.g., Pope and 
Walker 1999; Giner and Rees 2001). For example, Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) 
compare timeliness in common law and code law countries. They argue that because 
shareholders, lenders and others are assumed, under common law, to be at arm’s length 
                                                 
8 In addition, shareholder litigation, the link between taxation and financial reporting, and the incentives of 
standard setters and regulators may all contribute to conservatism (Watts 2003a). 
9 Managers also prefer an accounting system that incorporates losses in a timely fashion because it allows 
them to bond themselves ex ante to act in the interests of shareholders and, thus, make their employment 
contracts more valuable (Ball 2001). 
10 Notwithstanding the desirable aspects of conservatism discussed, not all accountants have a favorable 
view of conservatism. Most of this criticism relates to the fact that conservatism in the current period may 
lead to aggressive reporting in future periods. Penman (2003, p.87) points out that consistent application of 
conservative accounting results in higher book rates of return and earnings growth without any economic 
justification. In discussing the evidence of increasing conservatism over time, Watts (2003b, p.292) 
concludes that U.S. firms’ earnings (and the earnings of firms in other common law countries) are timely in 
reflecting bad news, but are not timely at all in reflecting good news (which might be related to overly 
conservative accounting). 
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from the firm (as contrasted with the stakeholder model in code law countries), 
information asymmetry generally is ameliorated by timely public disclosure (Ball et al. 
2000). Consistent with their arguments, they find that earnings are significantly more 
timely in incorporating bad news (i.e., earnings are more conservative) in common law 
countries than in code law countries.11
It is also documented that U.S. accounting practice appears to have become more 
conservative over recent decades (Basu 1997; Givoly and Hayn 2000; Pae et al. 2005; 
Ball and Shivakumar 2006). Basu (1997) observes that increases in conservatism 
coincide with increases in auditors’ exposure to legal liability. Pae et al. (2005) posit that 
the explanation lies in increased SEC enforcement of accounting standards over time. 
Givoly and Hayn (2000) ascribe the increase in conservatism to numerous FASB 
standards that yield earlier accruals of expenses and losses and deferrals of revenue 
recognition, and also to the increasingly litigious environment faced by corporate 
managers. 
Notwithstanding the large number of studies employing differential timeliness as 
their measure of conservatism, recently researchers have argued that the use of this 
measure should be more selective and qualified. Givoly et al. (2004) demonstrate that the 
use of differential timeliness leads to anomalous results. The authors show that the 
measure fails to detect conservatism in instances where it is most likely to exist. In 
addition, although one might expect the degree of conservatism to be a relatively long-
term characteristic of the firm’s reporting system, Givoly et al. (2004) document that 
differential timeliness is highly volatile over time. They attribute the results to the use of 
aggregated measures of earnings and returns as well as the nature of events occurring 
during the period and firms’ disclosure policies (see also Gigler and Hemmer 2001). 
They conclude that differential timeliness suffers from serious measurement errors and 
that care should be taken when employing the measure in empirical studies.12,13
                                                 
11 Ball and Shivakumar (2005) examine differential timeliness for U.K. private versus public firms. In fact, 
they describe firms with high differential timeliness as having “higher quality” earnings. They find that 
privately held firms exhibit significantly less differential timeliness. 
12 Price (2005) documents that not only are earnings more sensitive to current bad news, they are also more 
sensitive to lagged bad news and that as much as 65% of bad news is incorporated in stock price before it is 
incorporated in earnings. This finding is not consistent with the implicit assumption of the Basu model in 
which bad news is always concurrently reflected in earnings and returns. Price (2005) also provides support 
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Ball and Shivakumar (2005; 2006) discuss the role of accruals and accounting 
conservatism in the context of earnings management measurement. In addition to the role 
accruals play in mitigating noise in cash flows (e.g., Dechow 1994), they argue that a 
major role of accruals is to recognize gains and losses in a timely fashion, particularly 
losses. They argue that timely gain and loss recognition through accruals improve the 
timeliness of earnings and thus improve the usefulness of financial statements generally. 
Ball and Shivakumar (2006) demonstrate the role of accruals in the asymmetry between 
gain and loss recognition timeliness. That is, economic losses are more likely to be 
recognized on a timely basis, as accrued charges against income, whereas the recognition 
of economic gains is more likely to be deferred until realized in cash. Ball and 
Shivakumar (2006) improve on the Basu (1997) specification by using abnormal returns 
rather than raw returns and by relating conservatism to accruals. Nevertheless, the various 
accrual models employed in Ball and Shivakumar (2006) are ad hoc although they have 
been used extensively in prior research. In a related study, Pae et al. (2005) find that the 
accrual component of earnings, but not the cash flow component of earnings, is more 
conservative for firms with low balance sheet conservatism (defined as a low market-to-
book ratio) than for firms with high balance sheet conservatism. This finding is consistent 
with accruals being used to effect earnings conservatism. 
In this paper, we focus on a direct measure of conservatism, namely, earnings 
news, and relate this measure to special items, another metric of conservatism. Thus, our 
paper is related to Ball and Shivakumar (2005; 2006) in that we study how special item 
accruals are used for effective timely recognition of economic losses. The focus on 
special items is also consistent with Givoly et al.’s (2004) suggestion of using 
disaggregated earnings measures when measuring accounting conservatism. 
 
2.2 Special Items 
According to GAAP, special (or unusual) items are material items that are 
considered unusual in nature or occur infrequently. Such items can have a very large 
                                                                                                                                                 
for some of the findings in Givoly et al. (2004) that other factors besides conservatism can induce 
asymmetric timeliness of earnings. 
13 Dietrich, Muller, and Riedl (2006) argue that many of the empirical results in the conservatism literature 
are attributable to the estimation procedure rather than to conservatism. 
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impact on earnings and book value of assets and equity. For example, in their review of 
empirical studies of asset write-downs, Alciatore et al. (1998) identify a mean write-down 
ranging from 4% to over 19% of total assets, with maximum write-downs reaching 90%. 
In addition, Riedl and Srinivasan (2006) document a large increase in both the frequency 
and magnitude of reported special items throughout the period 1993 – 2002. Although 
gains also occur, such as gains from sales of assets, the majority of special items are 
losses. The preponderance of special or unusual losses reflect the conservative bias of 
accrual accounting that requires early recognition of declines in asset values but tends to 
delay recognition of most gains until realized. In addition, the magnitude of special items 
suggests that they represent an economically significant proxy for how conservatism is 
achieved by firms. 
The literature on special items focuses primarily on earnings and the earnings 
response coefficient (ERCs). Fairfield, Sweeney, and Yohn (1996) analyze accuracy 
improvements in out-of-sample one-year-ahead forecasts of the return on equity to 
examine the predictive content of earnings disaggregations. They document that 
disaggregating earnings into operating earnings, non-operating earnings, and special 
items improves forecasts. Their results suggest that, although special items can result 
either from proper application of GAAP (e.g., a write-down of impaired assets) or from 
earnings management (e.g., big bath accounting that artificially improves future reported 
profitability), separate disclosure of these items may improve the usefulness of financial 
reports.14,15
Elliott and Hanna (1996) investigate the information content of earnings in the 
presence of large nonrecurring or unusual charges. Consistent with anecdotal evidence 
                                                 
14 In a valuation context, special items are theorized to be of minimal relevance since they are transitory in 
nature. However, Black, Carnes, and Richardson (2000) find that special items are value relevant. This 
finding holds both for firms that report single and for firms that report multiple occurrences of such items 
over a rolling six year period. Value relevance is consistent with special items reflecting a persistent 
negative shock to future earnings and cash flows. 
15 Dechow and Ge (2006) find that low accrual firms with large negative special items consistently earn 
higher positive returns than other low accrual firms. This finding is robust to including proxies for investor 
sentiment, bankruptcy risk, and investor recognition. According to the authors, special items reflect 
underlying economics and are indicative of firms that have over-invested in (ex post) poor strategies. 
Dechow and Ge (2006) argue that special items are indicative of management taking action to turn the firm 
around, but that investors overweight the probability that the firm will be unsuccessful. They show 
empirically that special item–low accrual firms end up “turning themselves around” at higher rates than 
expected by investors and, as a consequence, show improved stock price performance. 
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that the frequent reporting of write-offs can impair investors’ ability to assess firm 
performance, Elliott and Hanna (1996) find that the valuation weight on earnings before 
special items declines significantly in quarters following the recognition of large special 
items. ERCs decline even further if subsequent special items are reported. They also 
document that the ERC on special items is lower than the ERC on earnings before special 
items (consistent with the notion that special items are more transitory than other 
components of earnings) and that the ERC on special items declines with the frequency 
of reported special items. 
Burgstahler, Jiambalvo, and Shevlin (2002) examine the association of the post-
announcement earnings drift with earnings components, including special items. They 
document that, consistent with previous research, special items are more transient than 
other earnings components. However, they also find significant differences between 
positive and negative special items. Positive special items are less than completely 
transitory in that they are followed by a smaller but still positive amount of earnings in 
subsequent quarters. Negative special items, on the other hand, are followed by positive 
earnings in subsequent quarters.  
Francis, Hanna, and Vincent (1996) examine whether managerial manipulation or 
economic impairment drives write-off decisions and whether the market reacts differently 
in the two cases. They find that proxies for both manipulation and impairment are 
significantly related to the write-off decision,16 and on average, investors react negatively 
to write-offs. However, they document significant positive reactions to restructuring 
charges.17
                                                 
16 Incentives are not significantly related to inventory and fixed assets write-offs, but are strongly 
significantly associated with restructuring charges and goodwill write-offs. 
17 Two recent papers by Riedl (2004) and Segal (2003) are directly related to Francis et al. (1996). Riedl 
(2004) examines long-lived asset impairments. In particular, he investigates whether SFAS 121 leads to 
improvements in the reporting of impairment charges. Contrary to the intentions of FASB, he finds that 
economic factors have a lower explanatory power for write-offs after SFAS 121. He also finds that big bath 
behavior explains more of the variation in write-offs after the new standard takes effect (and that these big 
baths likely reflect opportunistic behavior rather than the provision of managers' private information). In a 
similar study, Segal (2003) contrasts goodwill write-downs before and after SFAS 142. SFAS 142 was 
intended to reduce managerial discretion and enhance the reporting for goodwill impairments. However, 
Segal (2003) does not find any significant differences in the reporting incentives before and after SFAS 
142. Similarly, he does not find any difference in the market reaction to write-downs following the 
implementation of the new standard. Segal (2003) concludes that goodwill write-downs continue to be 
significantly associated with managers’ reporting incentives. 
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Frankel and Roychowdhury (2005) find that the timeliness of IBES earnings is 
less asymmetric than that of GAAP earnings. Since IBES earnings are purged of many 
“special items,” this finding can be interpreted as special items being an important means 
of implementing accounting conservatism. Consistent with this notion, Shroff, 
Venkataraman, and Zhang (2004) find that negative special items have a higher relation 
with concurrent stock returns than positive special items.18
 In conclusion, researchers have shown considerable interest both in conservative 
accounting in general and in special items. However, there is limited empirical evidence 
on how market participants price conservative accounting in general and special items in 
particular. Our study aims to provide more evidence regarding these issues using the 
theoretical framework of Vuolteenaho (2002).  
 
3. The Conceptual Analysis 
This section provides a conceptual analysis of the relations among earnings news, 
special items, and revisions in returns. In particular, we show that earnings news and 
special items are nonlinearly related to revisions in equity returns provided that (i) the 
accounting system is conservative and (ii) equity markets learn about shocks to firm 
earnings (cash flows) from non-accounting as well as accounting sources. We illustrate 
these relations using a relatively simple but nevertheless rich example. For simplicity, 
absent specific information such as special items to indicate otherwise, shocks to earnings 
are assumed to be completely transitory and expected returns (discount rates) are 
assumed to be intertemporally constant.19 Furthermore, we do not incorporate the 
conservatism ratio in this section. Instead, Appendix A develops and examines the 
conservatism ratio under more general conditions.  
Suppose that management (and/or the auditors) suddenly anticipate a negative 
shock to the firm’s expected future cash flows, for example, in the form of a reduction in 
the market value of a long-lived asset. In an “ideal” conservative accounting system, the 
negative shock will be accrued in earnings in a timely fashion (relative to actual cash 
                                                 
18 In contrast, Riedl and Srinivasan (2005) do not find a significant difference in response coefficients 
across positive and negative special items.  
19 In the empirical analysis below, we specifically control for expected return news. 
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flow realizations), in the form of a special item (asset write-down). Provided that the 
asset is carried on the books at its market value prior to the shock, meaning that 
accumulated book depreciation equals accumulated economic depreciation, and provided 
the firm has a 100 percent dividend payout ratio policy, the asset write-down will exactly 
equal to the shock to current and future cash flows (i.e. earnings news) and the change in 
market value of equity. Investors should correctly interpret the special item as conveying 
new information of an impending negative shock to future cash flows, driving down 
equity returns by the amount of the asset write-down in a timely fashion. Thus, earnings 
news, special items, and the revision in equity returns are all negative and equal to each 
other. 
Now consider the symmetrically opposite case in which management anticipates a 
positive shock to expected future cash flows, that is, positive earnings news. In an ideal 
conservative accounting system there are no special items to reflect the positive shock; 
and positive earnings news will not be recorded in the accounts until the future cash 
flows are realized. Furthermore, if accounting is the only source of news about shocks to 
future cash flows, then the revision to returns is zero as well.  
Thus, when the accounting reports are the only source of information, the 
relations among the three variables are linear with only difference being that with 
negative shocks these variables are negative and with positive shocks these variables are 
zero. In addition, linearity obtains whether the accounting system is conservative or not, 
although the shock to returns depends upon the extent of conservatism.  
Suppose instead that equity markets are able to learn about positive shocks to 
future cash flows from non-accounting sources. When the shock to cash flows is 
negative, earnings news, special items, and revisions to returns are negative and equal to 
each other as before. However, when the shocks to future cash flows are positive, 
earnings new and special items are equal and zero because of conservatism but equity 
returns will adjust to reflect the positive shock because of non-accounting sources of 
information. Therefore, when the equity markets can learn about positive shocks to future 
firm cash flows from non-accounting sources, the ideal conservative accounting system 
will generate a nonlinear relation between earnings news and revisions in returns and 
between special items and revisions in returns. Hence, the existence of information 
 10
sources other than the accounting system is a necessary condition for the nonlinear 
relation between revisions in returns and earnings news.20  
This analysis indicates that in an ideal conservative accounting system, the 
nonlinear relation between earnings news and revisions in returns is identical to the 
nonlinear relation between special items and revisions in returns. However, the 
conservative accounting system defined by GAAP is far from ideal. In particular, GAAP 
and firm financing/investment policies create a wedge between earnings news and special 
items. There are three main reasons why special items are a less than perfect measure of 
negative earnings news and, hence, a less than perfect measure of the revision in equity 
returns. First, book depreciation rarely equals economic depreciation. If accumulated 
book depreciation is greater than accumulated economic depreciation then the asset 
write-down to bring the asset’s book value to market value will be less than earnings 
news. Conversely, if accumulated book depreciation is less than accumulated economic 
depreciation then the asset write-down to bring book value to market value will 
necessarily be greater than earnings news. Second, under GAAP, if the sum of the future 
undiscounted cash flows from the asset is greater than the carrying value of the asset, no 
special item is recognized even though there is a negative shock to the asset’s future cash 
flows. Third, if the firm’s policy is to reinvest free cash flows from the asset, the 
reduction in free cash flows arising from the negative shock to the asset’s future cash 
flows will also drive a wedge between special items (that do not recognize this 
opportunity cost) and negative earnings news. Thus, under GAAP, when earnings news is 
negative, special items and earnings news (revision in returns) will be positively 
correlated but they will not be equal to each other. 
Similarly, under GAAP, special items that provide timely information about 
positive earnings shocks are sometimes recognized, albeit fairly infrequently (e.g., if the 
firm recognizes a gain on sale of an asset, or the firm reverses a portion of a restructuring 
charge anticipated to be larger). Thus, under GAAP, special items can be positive and 
positively correlated with (although unlikely to be equal to) positive earnings news. 
Therefore, under GAAP, the relation between special items and revision in returns will be 
                                                 
20 This condition is also necessary for the nonlinear relation between returns and earnings as in Basu 
(1997). 
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nonlinear but generally weaker than the nonlinear relation between earnings news and 
revision in returns. 
In short, the asymmetry inherent in conservative accounting under GAAP, 
coupled with alternative sources of value relevant information, lead to an asymmetric 
response by equity markets to positive earnings news (special items) relative to negative 
earnings news (special items). As a result, revisions to equity returns are more highly 
correlated with negative earnings news (special items) than with positive earnings news 
(special items). Furthermore, under GAAP, special items, positive or negative, provide an 
imperfect measure of the impact of new information on equity returns relative to earnings 
news yielding a weaker nonlinear relation between special items and revision in returns 
by comparison to the nonlinear relation between earnings news and revision in returns. 
An example will help explicate these ideas. 
 
BENCHMARK SCENARIO     
 T=0 t=1 t=2 T=3 
CF -30,000 13,139 13,139 13,139 
NI --- 3,139 5,110 7,377 
MS --- 13,139 28,250 45,626 
PPE-BV 30,000 20,000 10,000 0 
PPE-MV 30,000 21,361 11,425 0 
BV 30,000 33,139 38,250 45,626 
MV 30,000 34,500 39,675 45,626 
COC --- 15% 15% 15% 
RET --- 15% 15% 15% 
  
Consider a new all equity firm that invests $30,000 in a depreciable plant at t=0. 
The firm’s cost of capital (COC) is an intertemporally constant 15%. The plant earns 
expected cash returns of $13,139 (end of year) for each of three periods and then the firm 
costlessly liquidates. Cash returns from plant activity are invested in marketable 
securities that earn the firm’s cost of capital.21 The firm depreciates the asset using the 
straight line method. There are no taxes. Given these data, the present value of the plant 
and its market value at t=0 is $30,000. An investor would earn an IRR of 15% on the 
                                                 
21 The assumption that free cash flows remain invested in the firm and are not paid out as dividends adds 
additional illustrative complexity to the analysis. 
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investment. Each period the financial report shows a depreciation expense accrual of 
$10,000. The stock price goes up by 15% a year. See the BENCHMARK SCENARIO in 
the table above for end of period book value of equity (BV), market value of equity 
(MV), cash flows from operations (CF), earnings (NI), book value of property, plant, and 
equipment (PPE-BV), market value of property, plant, and equipment (PPE-MV), 
holding period stock return (RET), and marketable securities (MS),.22
Scenario 1 is similar to the benchmark scenario with one major difference. Just 
prior to publication of the financial report at t=2, management discovers that cash flows 
for the period are 10% lower than expected, $11,825 instead of $13,139, and 
consequently also revises downwards its estimates of expected future plant cash flows 
from $13,139 to $9,854 at t=3, a reduction of 25% from the benchmark scenario. The 
carrying value of PPE at t=2 prior to the change in estimate is $10,000 whereas the 
(revised) undiscounted future cash flows from the asset are $9,854. Since the carrying 
value of PPE is less than the undiscounted future cash flows, an impairment is recognized 
under current GAAP and a special accrual of -$1,431 = (9,854/(1.15)-10,000) is recorded 
in order to bring PPE down to its market value of $8,569. In contrast, earnings news (NE), 
the reduction in the value of the firm over its remaining lifetime due to the revision of 
expected future cash flows, is -$4,266, closely corresponding to the (unexpected) change 
in market value (DEL(MV)) of -$4,170 (=35,505-39,675).23 The reduction in market 
value translates into a revision in expected returns (rt-Et-1(rt)) of -12% relative to the 
benchmark scenario. Note that the change in the market value of the firm is comprised of 
a reduction in the (market) value of PPE of -$2,856 (=8,569-11,425) and of a reduction in 
the end of year balance of marketable securities of -$1,314 (=26,396-28,250). Of course, 
                                                 
22 Net income (NI) equals cash flow (CF) minus depreciation expense plus investment income, computed as 
beginning-of-period balance of marketable securities (MS) multiplied by the cost of capital (COC). PPE-
MV is computed as the present value of future cash flows. Finally, market value (MV) is computed as the 
sum of PPE-MV and MS. 
23 The small difference in the two numbers is due to the fact that earnings news is computed here somewhat 
inexactly but more simply as the sum of the changes in ROE multiplied by the beginning of period book 
value of equity over the life of the firm. Earnings news is defined more exactly in Section 4 below. Note 
that earnings news in Scenario 1 is computed based upon the period 2 report. This computation does not 
presuppose knowledge of the period 3 shock beyond the period 2 special items. In particular, given the 
asset write-down (special items) in period 2, plant cash flows in the next period equal the product of the 
asset value and COC. Moreover, the period 3 return on marketable securities (the beginning of the period 
balance of MS times COC) and depreciation expense are also known. Ultimately, special items are what 
link the period 3 shock to the period 2 report. 
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whether this negative earnings shock is fully reflected in equity returns in the current 
period depends upon whether shareholders learn of the downward revision of expected 
cash flows. Absent for now non-accounting sources of information, the primary source of 
information to the equity market regarding the downward revision in future cash flows is 
the recorded special item. 
Scenario 1 raises a measurement issue.. The recorded special item is only -$1,431 
whereas the reduction in equity value is the earnings news of -$4,170, a difference of -
$2,739. This difference has two sources: (1) the difference between the carrying value of 
the asset and its market value of -$1,425 = (10,000-11,425), caused by a (straight line) 
depreciation policy that differs from economic depreciation; and (2) the reduction in the 
investment in marketable securities due to the reduced operational cash flows of -$1,314, 
caused by the less than one hundred percent dividend payout ratio and the fact that the 
GAAP definition of special items does not include this opportunity cost. These results are 
summarized in the table below denoted SCENARIO 1. 
 
 
SCENARIO 1         
  t=0 t=1 t=2 T=3 
CF -30,000 13,139 11,825 9,854 
NI --- 3,139 2,365 5,326 
MS --- 13,139 26,936 40,830 
PPE-BV 30,000 20,000 8,569 0 
PPE-MV 30,000 21,361 8,569 0 
BV 30,000 33,139 35,505 40,830 
MV 30,000 34,500 35,505 40,830 
NE=ΔE(ROE)*BVt-1 --- 0 -4,266 0 
DEL(MV) --- 0 -4,170 0 
SI --- 0 -1,431 0 
COC --- 15% 15% 15% 
RET --- 15% 3% 15% 
rt-Et-1(rt) --- 0% -12% 0% 
 
The comparison of Scenario 1 with the benchmark scenario is illustrative. First, 
the conventional earnings surprise is an incomplete measure of the news event, because 
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the change in market value is determined both by revisions to current cash flows (the 
conventional earnings surprise) in period 2 and to expected future cash flows in period 3. 
Indeed, the conventional earnings surprise of -$2,745 (=2,365-5,110) understates the 
overall shock to future cash flows, whereas earnings news captures the total shock to 
future cash flows. Second, bad news is defined by the revision to period 2 returns of -
12% (=3%-15%) and not by the period 2 return of 3%. Therefore, an analysis using raw 
returns is potentially misspecified. Third, the special items accrual significantly 
understates earnings news and the revision to equity returns.24 This scenario indicates 
that while earnings news and the revision in equity returns are perfectly positively 
correlated, special items are less than perfectly positively correlated with either earnings 
news or the revision in equity returns, despite the fact that special items signal and 
provide information about the shock to future cash flows to shareholders. 
Scenario 2 is also a negative earnings event. Specifically, Scenario 2 is similar to 
Scenario 1 except that expected future plant cash flows at t=3 are identical to the cash 
flows at t=2 of $11,825. Unlike Scenario 1, the reduction in plant value is not recognized 
as an impairment under GAAP because the carrying value of the asset ($10,000) is less 
than the undiscounted value of the expected future cash flows ($11,825). In the absence 
of a special item or external sources of information to signal the reduction in future cash 
flows beyond t=2, equity values fall only by 4% at t=2 and with the remaining reduction 
of 3% at t=3. Earnings news is -$1,314 in period 2 and -$1,258 in period 3 as compared 
to the unexpected changes in market value of -$1,314 in both periods.25 By comparison 
to Scenario 1, zero special items are a rather poor measure of negative earnings news and 
the consequent reduction in the equity value of the firm. Note that there is negative 
market reaction in both periods 2 and 3 (-4% and -3%, respectively) because there is no 
special item (or other sources of information) to signal the further reduction in asset value 
in period 3. This example shows that the gap between earnings news and special items is 
affected by the GAAP definition of an impairment event, in addition to the two other 
                                                 
24 Of course, if the firm adopts a depreciation policy such that book depreciation is less than economic 
depreciation, the special item could potentially overstate earnings news and the revision in equity values, 
although this is unlikely. It is even more unlikely if free cash flows are not paid out as dividends. More 
often than not, the historical cost basis of asset value understates market value, so that special items are 
likely to understate earnings news and the revision to equity values. 
25 Note that in this scenario the shocks to cash flows are assumed to be completely transitory and, hence, 
the earnings news in period 2 only captures the shock to ROE in period 2. 
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reasons illustrated in Scenario 1. In particular, scenario 2 is characterized by no 
association between earnings news and special items and a (perfectly) positive 
association between earnings news and the unexpected revision to equity returns. These 
results are summarized in the table below denoted SCENARIO 2.26
 
SCENARIO 2         
  t=0 t=1 t=2 T=3 
CF -30,000 13,139 11,825 11,825 
NI --- 3,139 3,796 5,866 
MS --- 13,139 26,936 42,801 
PPE-BV 30,000 20,000 10,000 0 
PPE-MV 30,000 21,361 11,425 0 
BV 30,000 33,139 36,936 42,801 
MV 30,000 34,500 38,361 42,801 
NE=ΔE(ROE)*BVt-1 --- 0 -1,314 -1,314 
DEL_MV ---  -1,314 -1,314 
SI --- 0 0 0 
COC --- 15% 15% 15% 
RET --- 15% 11% 12% 
rt-Et-1(rt) --- 0% -4% -3% 
 
Scenario 3 illustrates a positive earnings news event. Again, it is assumed that 
accounting reports are the only source of information about shocks to future cash flows. 
Instead of expecting cash flows to decrease, management expects cash flows to increase 
10% relative to the benchmark at t=2, from $13,139 to $14,453, and 25% relative to the 
benchmark at t=3, from $13,139 to $16,424. Thus, Scenario 3 is completely symmetric to 
Scenario 1 but with positive shocks to future cash flows. Absent accrual information on 
the gains because of conservatism and absent external sources of information about the 
shock, shareholders do not learn about the new situation until the cash flows are realized 
(i.e., no positive special items are recognized). In this scenario, earnings news 
(unexpected change in market value) is $1,314 ($1,314) in period 2 and $3,229 ($3,285) 
                                                 
26 If the market learns about the negative shock to cash flows in period 3 then the correlation between 
earnings news and unexpected returns would not be perfect, yet still be positive. The associations of 
unexpected revisions in returns and earnings news with special items would still be zero. 
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in period 3, resulting in unexpected returns of 4% and 8%, respectively. Thus, under this 
scenario, there is no association between special items and earnings news and between 
special items and the revision in equity returns. The revision in equity returns is 
(perfectly) positively associated with earnings news. The results of this scenario are 
summarized in the table below denoted SCENARIO 3.27  
 
 
SCENARIO 3         
  t=0 t=1 T=2 T=3 
CF -30,000 13,139 14,453 16,424 
NI --- 3,139 6,424 10,859 
MS --- 13,139 29,563 50,422 
PPE-BV 30,000 20,000 10,000 0 
PPE-MV 30,000 21,361 14,282 0 
BV 30,000 33,139 39,563 50,422 
MV 30,000 34,500 43,845 50,422 
NE=ΔE(ROE)*BVt-1 --- 0 1,314 3,285 
DEL_MV ---  1,314 3,285 
SI --- 0 0 0 
COC --- 15% 15% 15% 
RET --- 15% 19% 23% 
rt-Et-1(rt) --- 0% 4% 8% 
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the relation between the revision to returns and earnings news 
for Scenarios 1 and 3 assuming unrealistically that accounting reports are the only source 
of information for equity markets. Since accounting reports are the only source of news, 
the revision in returns are necessarily linearly related to earnings news, although because 
of conservatism negative news has a greater impact on returns than positive news (-12% 
versus 4%).28  
                                                 
27 Scenario 3 assumes that no positive special items are recorded. However, as noted above, under GAAP, 
positive special items are sometimes recognized when earnings news is positive so that empirically one 
should expect a weak correlation between special items and positive earnings news and special items and 
the revision in returns. 
28 We convert dollar earnings news to percentage by dividing the dollar earnings news by beginning of the 
period book value of equity. For example, in Scenario 3 the percentage earnings news equals to 4% 
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Once we allow for non-accounting alternative sources of information for positive 
shocks, the relation between the revision to returns and earnings news become 
nonlinear.29 The case of negative earnings shocks (Scenario 1) remains unchanged since 
in that case all the relevant information is available to the equity markets from the 
accounts anyway. What does change is the case of positive earnings shocks (Scenario 3). 
Scenario 4 below shows what happens when accounting reports are not the only source of 
information for the capital markets in the case of positive earnings shocks. Because of the 
information from non-accounting sources, shareholders learn at t=2 of management’s 
expectations of future cash flow increases. Consequently, returns adjust fully at t=2 to the 
positive news. Period 2 returns increase from 15% to 28% to reflect expected cash flow 
changes in both periods 2 and 3 ($4,170). In contrast, under conservative accounting, the 
accounts are unaffected by the change in expectations about future cash flow increases so 
that earnings news and special items are unchanged from Scenario 3. A comparison of 
Scenarios 1 and 4 shows that alternative non-accounting sources of information about 
positive firm shocks and conservative accounting in tandem create a nonlinear convex 
relation between revisions in returns and earnings news (see Figure 2).  
Further justification for the claim that conservatism generates a nonlinear convex 
relation between revisions in returns and earnings news is provided by Callen (2006). He 
models conditional conservatism as a right-truncated shock to earnings in a Vuolteenaho 
framework. He derives analytically the relations between revisions in returns and 
earnings news both for a firm with a symmetric unbiased accounting system and for a 
conservative firm. Callen shows that while the relation between revisions in returns and 
earnings news is linear for the unbiased firm, the relation is convex nonlinear for the 
conservative firm just as described in the scenario analysis above.     
                                                                                                                                                 
(=1,314/33,139). The percentage earnings news equals (by construction) to unexpected ROE. The expected 
ROE is 15.4% (=5,110/33,139, see Benchmark Scenario) and the actual ROE is 19.4% (=6,424/33,139). 
29 The non-linearity result is robust to allowing non-accounting information to also inform about negative 
shocks. But, in that case, accounting might be irrelevant (dominated) to the extant that external sources 
provide similar information about negative shocks and better information about positive shocks. More 
realistically, the more conservative the accounting system, the more likely is management to provide better 
(more timely) information about negative shocks and the non-accounting system to provide better 
information about positive shocks. In that case, nonlinearity obtains and accounting matters. 
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The relation between revisions in returns and special items (see Figure 3) is 
discontinuous and quasi-convex irrespective of external sources of information.30 This is 
because special items in our scenarios are uniformly zero for positive shocks. Even under 
GAAP, special items typically understate the revision in returns for positive news shocks 
yielding a nonlinear relation whether or not security adjust fully to positive news. 
 
SCENARIO 4         
  t=0 T=1 T=2 T=3 
CF -30,000 13,139 14,453 16,424 
NI --- 3,139 6,424 10,859 
MS --- 13,139 29,563 50,422 
PPE-BV 30,000 20,000 10,000 0 
PPE-MV 30,000 21,361 14,282 0 
BV 30,000 33,139 39,563 50,422 
MV 30,000 34,500 43,845 50,422 
NE=ΔE(ROE)*BVt-1 --- 0 1,314 3,285 
DEL_MV ---  4,170 0 
SI --- 0 0 0 
COC --- 15% 15% 15% 
RET --- 15% 27% 15% 
rt-Et-1(rt) --- 0% 12% 0% 
 
Together with the Vuolteenaho (2002) model, the above conceptual analysis 
provides the framework for our empirical investigation. First, we examine the association 
between earnings news and special items, and, in particular, we contrast the association 
between negative earnings news and special items and positive earnings news and special 
items. Second, we analyze the relations between revisions in equity returns and earnings 
news and between revisions in equity returns and special items. Third, in a further 
analysis, we investigate the relations between revisions in equity returns and the 
conventional earnings surprise and between revisions in equity returns and earnings 
levels. Finally, we empirically analyze the conservatism ratio.   
                                                 
30 The numbers in Figure 3 are based on Scenarios 1 and 4. Scenarios 1 and 3 yield the same qualitative 
result except that unexpected returns will a bit more than 4% instead of 12% in the positive quadrant. 
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4. The Vuolteenaho (2002) Return Decomposition Model 
Extending prior work by Campbell (1991) and Campbell and Ammer (1993), 
Vuolteenaho (2002) employs the Clean Surplus Relation to show that revisions in stock 
returns can be expressed as a function of earnings news and expected return (discount 
rate) news. Formally,   
1
0 1
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     (1) 
where  
Δ denotes the first differencing operator  
Et is the expectations operator and ΔEt = Et(·) - Et-1(·)  
rt = log equity return (cum dividend) in excess of the risk free rate in period t 
ρ is a constant error approximation term  
 it = log of one plus the risk free rate in period t  
roe = log of one plus return on equity (i.e., earnings divided by beginning of period book 
value of equity) 
Defining the unexpected stock return components as expected-return news (Nr) 
and earnings news (Ne), equation (1) can be expressed as:31
 
rt - Et-1(rt) = Ne - Nr         (2) 
where 
0
(jt t j t j
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t rENr +
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=
∑Δ=
1
ρ = Expected Return News     (4) 
Equation (2) shows that the unexpected revision in current equity returns 
increases with earnings news and decreases with expected return news. An unanticipated 
increase in the firm’s earnings conveys positive information about the firm’s prospects 
 
31 As a sensitivity analysis we estimate earnings news as the sum of accruals news and cash flow news (see 
Callen and Segal 2004). The idea behind this alternative estimation is that the breakdown of earnings into 
cash flows and accruals may provide a better prediction of future cash flows than earnings alone. No 
inferences are affected if we use this alternative approach. However, breaking down earnings to accruals 
and cash flows precludes us from computing our conservatism ratio.  
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and hence translates into higher returns. Conversely, an unexpected increase in future 
expected returns (discount rates) due to higher risk, for example, translates into negative 
unexpected current returns, similar to the effect of an increase in the yield rate on bond 
prices. 
 In order to empirically examine the associations between earnings news, special 
items, and unexpected returns, and to construct the conservatism ratio, we need estimates 
of earnings news and expected return news. The return decomposition [Equation (2)] 
provides the basis. However, in order to implement the return decomposition, estimates 
of expected future returns and expected future earnings are required. Following Campbell 
(1991), Campbell and Ammer (1993), Vuolteenaho (2002), Callen and Segal (2004), and 
Callen, Hope, and Segal (2005), we implement the return decomposition using a 
parsimonious log-linear vector autoregressive (VAR) model with state variables 
consisting of log stock returns, log of one plus ROE (earnings scaled by initial book value 
of equity), and the log book to market ratio. Appendix B describes the estimation 
procedure in detail. 
To facilitate the analysis, we generate firm-year estimates of earnings news and 
expected return news by estimating the firm-year variance-covariance matrix and 
assuming that within-industry observations have the same VAR coefficient matrix. For 
example, earnings news [Equation (B6) in Appendix B] is a function of the VAR 
coefficient matrix [A] and the residuals from the VAR regressions [Equations (B2a) 
through (B2c)]. Thus, earnings news can be estimated at the firm-year level using the 
VAR coefficient matrix and the vector of residuals Εit=[e1it, e2it, e3it], where ej is the 
estimated residual from equation j and i (t) is the firm (time) index. The variance-
covariance matrix Ωit is computed as [Εitρ Εit] where ρ denotes the transpose. We then 
estimate the conservatism ratio as the residual from the earnings equation [Equation 
(B2b)] divided by earnings news. 
 
5.  Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
The data are obtained from annual COMPUSTAT and monthly CRSP files for the 
years 1962 to 2004. Return on equity is computed as income before extraordinary items 
(DATA18) scaled by the beginning of the period stockholders’ equity (DATA60). The 
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risk-free rate is the annualized three month T-Bill rate. Annual stock returns are 
computed from monthly CRSP data adjusted for dividends. Returns are computed over a 
period starting nine months before and ending three months after the fiscal year end. 
We impose the following restrictions on the data. First, we remove firms in the 
financial industry (SIC 6000-6999). Second, we require non-missing values of 
contemporaneous and one lag each of ROE, annual returns, and the book to market ratio. 
In addition, we require non-missing values of special items (DATA17). These restrictions 
yield a sample size of 114,061 firm-years. Eliminating firms with market value of equity 
less than $10M reduces the sample size to 94,540. Finally, in order to mitigate data errors 
and scaling problems, we delete the top and bottom one percent of all the variables 
included in the VAR system. These restrictions reduce the sample to 86,600 (10,292) 
firm-years (firms).  
Table 1 shows the distribution of the major variables of interest. The sample firms 
exhibit large variation in market capitalization; the mean and median market values of 
equity are $1,220 million and $119 million, respectively. Median cum dividend equity 
market returns and accounting returns on book value of equity are ten and twelve percent, 
respectively. The median book-to-market ratio is 0.65. To be consistent with the 
computation of earnings news, we compute special items (SI) as DATA17 scaled by 
beginning of the period book value of equity.32 Since SI is non-zero for only 28,789 firm-
years, the 25th percentile, median and 75th percentile of SI are zero.33 Finally, the mean 
(median) CR is 0.525 (0.407), indicating that on average the current period shock to 
earnings equals approximately 50% of the total economic shock to current and future 
cash flows. 
 
6. Empirical Results 
In this section we present the empirical results. We first provide descriptive 
statistics of the VAR estimation results and the news items. We then show the analysis of 
the relation between earnings news and special items, and present the results of the 
                                                 
32 As sensitivity tests, we repeat the analysis scaling special items by beginning of the period total assets or 
market value of equity. The results are similar to those reported.   
33 Untabulated results show that if we restrict the sample to observations with non-zero SI, then the mean 
and median SI are -0.039 and -0.015, respectively. 
 22
analysis of the association of earnings news and special items with revisions in 
unexpected returns. Finally, we introduce the conservatism ratio, its empirical properties, 
and association with economic shocks. We also briefly discuss how the conservatism 
ratio can be used in future research. 
 
6.1 VAR Estimation 
We estimate the VAR equations by industry using the Fama and French (1997) 
industry classification. Table 2, Panel A shows the mean estimated parameters across 
industries and their standard errors.34 The standard errors are computed using the Fama-
Macbeth (1973) method. The significant parameter estimates imply that returns are 
negatively associated with past returns and positively associated with past earnings and 
the past book-to-market ratio. Earnings are positively associated with past returns and 
past earnings and negatively associated with the past book-to-market ratio. The book-to-
market ratio is positively related to past returns, past earnings, and the past book-to-
market.   
Table 2, Panel B provides descriptive statistics of expected-return news (Nr), 
earnings news (Ne), and revisions in unexpected returns (rt−Et-1(rt)).35 To eliminate 
potential outliers we delete the top and bottom one percent of the news items and the 
revisions in unexpected returns, resulting in a sample of 82,398 observations. The mean 
and median of Ne (0.011 and 0.033, respectively) are significantly positive, indicating 
that on average the earnings news is “good.” The mean and median Nr are also 
significantly positive (0.003 and 0.005, respectively) and, similar to the findings of 
Vuolteenaho (2002), Callen and Segal (2004), and Callen, Hope, and Segal (2005), 
significantly smaller than Ne, indicating that earnings news is the main driver of revisions 
in unexpected returns at the firm level. The mean and median revisions in unexpected 
returns (0.002 and 0.009, respectively) are also positive, consistent with the positive 
mean and median earnings news. 
                                                 
34 Reported results are based on a parsimonious VAR using one lag. Untabulated results show that our 
inferences are robust to including two lags in the VAR estimation. 
35 The revision in unexpected returns is computed as the residual from the VAR return equation. See 
equation (B2a) in Appendix B.  
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Table 2, Panel C shows the Pearson and Spearman correlations among the 
variables of Equation (2). Ne (Nr) is positively (negatively) and significantly correlated 
with the revision in unexpected returns (rt−Et-1(rt)), and Ne and Nr are negatively and 
significantly correlated with each other. These correlations are consistent with the 
predictions of the model (Equation (2)). Specifically, the model predicts that the 
association of the revision in unexpected returns with Ne (Nr) is positive (negative). 
Table 2, Panel D presents the means for earnings news (Ne), expected-return 
news (Nr), and revisions in unexpected returns ranked by earnings news quintile 
portfolios. Quintile 1 is the most negative and quintile 5 is the most positive Ne quintile. 
This panel shows that revisions in unexpected returns increase monotonically with the Ne 
quintiles. Specifically, revisions in unexpected returns increase from -36%, in the lowest 
quintile, to 37% in the highest quintile. The Nr column shows that, excluding the first 
quintile, the mean of Nr decreases monotonically with Ne. This result indicates that 
earnings news is inversely related to expected-return news, suggesting that positive 
earnings news is associated with risk reduction and a concomitant decrease in the 
discount rate.36
 
6.2 Earnings News and Special Items 
Table 3 analyzes the relation between earnings news (Ne) and special items (SI). 
Panel A lists mean Ne and mean SI ranked by Ne quintile portfolios. Quintile 1 is the 
most negative and quintile 5 is the most positive Ne quintile. The results in this panel are 
generally consistent with our expectations. Specifically, when earnings news is negative 
(quintiles 1 and 2), so are special items. With the exception of quintile 3, when earnings 
news is positive (quintiles 4 and 5) special items are non-negative. This panel also shows 
that the means of SI increase monotonically from quintile 1 to quintile 5. For example, 
the mean of SI in quintile 1 is -0.049 and increases monotonically to 0.005 in quintile 5.37 
Overall, these results indicate that there is a positive relation between earnings news and 
special items.   
                                                 
36 We are not making a causality statement here but rather document an association. 
37 As a sensitivity analysis we examine the frequencies of positive and negative special items by earnings 
news portfolio quintiles. Going from the most negative earnings news (quintile 1) to the most positive 
earnings news (quintile 5), the proportion of firms with negative (positive) special items decreases 
(increases) monotonically with earnings news. 
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Panel B of Table 3 shows the results of regressing special items on earnings news, 
a dummy variable (D) equal to one if earnings news is negative and zero otherwise, and 
an interaction variable between earnings news and the dummy variable (D_Ne). We 
estimate the regression using panel data with firm and year fixed effects. The regression 
results show that the coefficient of earnings news is positive and significant. In addition, 
the interaction variable is positive and significant, indicating that the association between 
special items and negative earnings news is stronger than the association between special 
items and positive earnings news. These results are consistent with special items being an 
account through which conservatism is manifested. Specifically, when special items are 
negative (e.g., a write-off of a capital asset), it is an indication of a negative shock to 
future cash flows (earnings news). When special items are non-negative, the association 
with future cash flows is positive but weaker, consistent with the notion that good news 
generally is not recognized until the cash flows are realized.  
 
6.3 Earnings News, Special Items, and Revisions in Unexpected Returns 
We estimate Vuolteenaho’s (2002) equation in reverse regression form in the 
spirit of Basu (1997).38 More formally, based on equation (2), we regress earnings news 
on revisions in unexpected returns and expected-return news:  
 
Net = α0 + α1(rt−Et-1(rt)) + α2Nrt + εt       (5) 
 
where the αj are parameters and εt is a white noise innovation term. Consistent with the 
valuation model, we expect α1>0 and α2>0.39  
Given that earnings news equals the sum of the current period earnings shock and 
future earnings shocks, one can decompose Ne into its components and regress current 
period earnings shock (CES) on the independent variables in Equation (5) as well as the 
shock to future earnings (FNe). We also estimate a variant of the model using the level of 
earnings. Specifically, the current period earnings shock equals current period ROE (i.e., 
                                                 
38 In equation (2), the revisions in returns are tautologically determined by Ne and Nr so that there are no 
parameters to estimate. However, we test equation (2) using ex post revisions in returns so that the relation 
has an error structure. 
39 Note that α2>0 because Nr is on the other side of the equation in a reverse regression. 
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earnings scaled by beginning of period book value of equity) minus the expected ROE 
(see Equation B2b). Thus, we include the predicted ROE (PROE) as an explanatory 
variable in the levels regression.  
In addition, we argue above that special items are an imperfect substitute for 
earnings news so that special items should be non-negatively associated with revisions in 
equity returns. To examine this conjecture, we re-estimate the regression with special 
items as the dependent variable.  
We estimate the regressions using panel data with firm and year fixed effects.40 
The regression results are presented in Table 4, Panel A. The results of the earnings news 
regression are presented in the Ne column in Panel A.41 The signs of the estimated 
coefficients are as conjectured – positive and highly significant at the 1% level. Similar to 
the earnings news regression, the signs of the estimated coefficients in the special item 
regression (SI column) are positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating a positive 
relation between special items and unexpected returns.42  
In a further analysis, we regress the current period earnings shock (CES) and the 
earnings level (ROE) on the revision in unexpected returns, expected return news and 
other control variables as dictated by the Vuolteenaho model. The shock to future 
earnings (FNe) and the predicted (expected) next period ROE (PROE) are the relevant 
controls.43 Consistent with the findings above, the coefficients on revisions in unexpected 
returns and expected-returns news in the current period earnings shock and the earnings 
level regressions (CES and ROE columns, respectively) are positive and significant. The 
coefficients on the shock to future earnings (FNe) in both regressions are positive and 
significant, and the coefficient on the predicted ROE in the ROE regression is also 
positive and significant.  
                                                 
40 We obtain similar results when estimating the regressions using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) methodology.  
41 Although Nrt and (rt−Et-1(rt)) are highly correlated - see Table 2, Panel C - the maximum Variance 
Inflation Factor of 2.18 and Condition Index of 2.56 are not indicative of multicollinearity.  
42 We also test whether the coefficients across the Ne and SI regressions are equal by estimating both 
equations as a system. The coefficient on the unexpected revisions in returns in the SI regression is 
significantly smaller (at less than the 1% level) than the coefficient on the unexpected revisions in returns 
in the Ne regression (α1), consistent with special items being a noisy measure of earnings news.  
43 These variables obtain by decomposing Equation (1) further so that  CES and ROE are the variables on 
the left-hand of the equation, respectively 
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These regressions, however, abstract from the potential nonlinearity induced by 
conservative accounting as discussed in the conceptual analysis. To test for nonlinearity, 
we estimate the equation: 
 
Net = β0 + β1D + β1(rt−Et-1(rt)) + β2 D*(rt−Et-1(rt))+ β3 Nrt + εt   (6) 
 
where the dummy variable (D) that takes a value of one if unexpected revisions in returns 
are negative:44
Panel B shows the regression results.45 In all regressions, the coefficient estimate 
on the revisions in unexpected returns, the interaction coefficient, and the expected-
returns news coefficient are all positive and significant at the 1% significance level. The 
positive coefficient on the interaction variable suggests differential timeliness in the 
incorporation of negative news relative to positive news. 
Following Basu (1997), we compute the ratio of the coefficient on the interaction 
variable to the sum of the coefficients on the interaction variable and revisions in 
unexpected returns to gauge the extent to which earnings news, special items, current 
period earnings shock, and earnings levels capture differential timeliness. These ratios are 
1.04, 1.15, 1.18 and 1.15, respectively.46  
 
6.4 Conservatism Ratio  
We compute a ratio (CR) that can be used to determine the degree of 
conservatism at the firm-year level, defined as the current period earnings shock (CES) 
divided by earnings news (Ne). The current period earnings shock is measured by the 
residual from the earnings equation (see Equation B2b of Appendix B) and earnings news 
is calculated according to Equation B6. CR therefore shows how much of the total shock 
to current and expected future earnings (cash flows) is recognized in current year 
earnings. By this criterion, firm X is more conservative than firm Y at time t if X’s 
                                                 
44 Callen (2006) derives equation (6) analytically by modeling the shocks to earnings of a conservative firm 
(in a VAR system) as a right-truncated error term.    
45 The Variance Inflation Factors for all four regressions are less than 10 indicating that multicollinearity is 
not a concern. 
46 For comparison, Basu (1997) reports a ratio of 4.66. The difference between the ratios is likely attributed 
to the inclusion of discount rate news, the shock to future earnings, and the predicted ROE in the 
regression.  
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conservatism ratio is greater (less) than Y’s conservatism ratio for a given negative 
(positive) economic shock (i.e., good/bad news) measured at time t. Thus, one has to 
control for economic news when gauging the degree of conservatism.  Appendix A 
develops the analytical properties of the conservatism ratio under fairly general 
conditions.  
We investigate the empirical properties of CR by examining its association with 
good and bad news using both univariate and multivariate analyses. Consistent with the 
conservative nature of accounting, we expect CR to be negatively associated with 
unexpected returns (a proxy for news) and to be more highly negatively associated with 
bad news events than with good news events. This follows because in a conservative 
environment more of the earnings shock should be recognized in current period earnings 
for bad news than for good news (for a given level of economic shock). 
Since a negative CR raises interpretation issues (see below), we delete the 
negative CR observations (11,009) from the analysis. In addition, we eliminate the top 
and bottom one percentile of CR (1,427 observations), resulting in a sample of 69,962 
observations.  
Table 5, Panel A presents a univariate analysis of the mean and median CR 
conditioned on the sign of unexpected returns. The mean (median) of CR for positive 
unexpected returns is 0.466 (0.388) as compared to 0.593 (0.439) for negative unexpected 
returns. The differences in the means and medians are significant at less than the 1% 
level. Hence, the univariate analysis indicates that CR is higher for bad news, consistent 
with differential timeliness. 
Panel B presents the multivariate analysis. In column (1), CR is regressed on 
revisions in unexpected returns, a dummy variable (D) equal to one if the revisions in 
unexpected returns is negative and zero otherwise, and the interaction of D and the 
revisions in unexpected returns. As expected the coefficient on the revisions in 
unexpected returns is negative and significant, and the coefficient on the interaction 
variable is positive and significant. Specifically, the coefficient on the revisions in 
unexpected returns is -0.41 and the coefficient on the interaction variable is 0.95. Hence, 
the coefficient on negative news equals 0.54. This indicates that CR is positively 
(negatively) associated with bad (good) news, consistent with the conservative nature of 
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financial accounting. In addition, similar to the findings in the univariate analysis, the 
coefficient for bad news is significantly greater (at the 1% level) than the absolute value 
of the coefficient on good news, consistent with differential timeliness. 
In column (2) we repeat the regression in column (1) after adding the following 
control variables: ROE, SIZE (log market value of equity), LOSS (a dummy variable 
equal to one if earnings are negative and zero otherwise), and SI. We do not have 
prediction for the signs of the coefficients on ROE and SIZE. We expect positive 
coefficient on LOSS and negative coefficient on SI.47 The coefficients on revisions in 
unexpected returns and the interaction variable are identical to those reported above. As 
expected the coefficient on LOSS is positive and significant indicating that CR is 
generally higher when firms report losses. The coefficient on SI is negative and 
significant consistent with higher CR when firms report negative special items (e.g. write 
offs).  
A negative CR raises interpretation issues. Specifically, the cases where earnings 
news is negative and the current period earnings shock (CES) is positive may represent 
overly aggressive financial reporting because the firm has a positive CES even though it 
will experience an overall negative shock to future cash flows. Similarly, cases where 
earnings news is positive and CES is negative may represent overly conservative 
financial reporting. The data are consistent with this conjecture. The correlation between 
CES and revisions in unexpected returns for negative CR observations is -0.68 in contrast 
to a correlation of 0.35 for observations where CES and earnings news are of the same 
sign (untabulated).48 We leave it for future research to investigate the negative CR cases 
more thoroughly.  
The conservatism ratio has potential for future research. For example, CR can be 
used to determine the extent of conservatism at the firm-year level. Since CR is a 
function of both the magnitude of the economic shock and the sign of the shock, it is 
important to control for both of these when determining the degree of conservatism. One 
possible way of doing so is to classify the sample observations into portfolios formed 
                                                 
47 Note that SI is negative for write-offs.  
48 Appendix A shows that earnings news is a weighted average of the CES and revisions in unexpected 
returns. Hence, CES and earnings news may be of opposite sign if CES and revisions in unexpected returns 
are also of opposite sign. 
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based on the annual revisions in unexpected returns, and rank the observations within 
each portfolio according to the CR. This ranking is a proxy for the degree of 
conservatism. One can then use this measure of conservatism for both cross-sectional and 
time-series analyses. For instance, researchers can examine how the cross-sectional 
differences in conservatism relate to factors that affect the reporting choices of the firm 
such as governance, auditor independence, or compensation. Another avenue for research 
is to investigate how the time-series properties of the degree of conservatism change with 
external factors such as new regulation (e.g. new accounting standards, Sarbanes-Oxley, 
etc.). 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper first analyzes the nonlinear pricing of conservatism using the return 
decomposition model of Vuolteenaho (2002) and investigates the pricing implications of 
special items, one of the major accrual items through which conservatism is facilitated. 
Consistent with implications of accounting conservatism for revisions in security returns, 
we show empirically that there is a significant increasing nonlinear relation between 
revisions in equity returns and revisions in expected current and future cash flows 
(earnings news). In particular, revisions in equity returns are more highly associated with 
negative earnings news than with positive earnings news. Our analysis of conservative 
accounting also implies that revisions in equity returns are a nonlinear function of special 
items such that revisions in equity returns are either more highly positively correlated 
with negative special items than with positive special items or revisions in equity returns 
are uncorrelated with special items. The empirical results confirm this conjecture as well. 
Our results imply that special items are an imperfect and noisy measure of unexpected 
revisions in expected future cash flows by comparison to earnings news, consistent with 
our conceptual analysis. 
Future research should try to control for a number of potential measurement 
issues that may be affecting these results. First, reporting special items as a separate line 
item, especially prior to the mid 1990’s, may have involved extensive self-selection by 
managers. Riedl (2004) reports on a survey by the FEI from 1991 which shows that 52% 
of write-offs were not included as special items (see also Riedl and Srinivasan 2006). 
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This suggests that firms “self select” into reporting special items (within GAAP 
enforcement constraints). Hence, we expect and observe that most special items will be 
negative to encourage investors to view them as one-time or “non-recurring” items. This 
self-selection process suggests that it may prove interesting and fruitful to examine 
(extreme) discretionary accruals in place of special items as an alternative measure of 
special items. Of course, discretionary accruals, like special items, can also be used as an 
earnings management tool. Second, the literature review reveals that not all special items 
are homogeneous and that, subject to data limitations, it may be useful to split special 
items into their component parts. 
This paper also develops a new direct metric of conservatism at the firm-year 
level based on the Vuolteenaho (2002) model. This conservatism ratio (CR) is computed 
as the ratio of the current earnings shock to earnings news. Hence, CR shows how much 
of the total shock to expected current and future earnings (cash flows) over the lifetime of 
the firm is recognized in current year earnings. Focusing on positive CR’s, we find that a 
greater proportion of the shock to cash flows is recognized in the current period when the 
shock is negative than when the shock is positive, consistent with conservative 
accounting. Negative CR’s are likely to reflect either overly aggressive accounting or 
overly conservative accounting depending upon whether earnings news is negative 
(positive) and the earnings surprise is positive (negative). The correlations between the 
earnings surprise and unexpected returns for negative versus positive CR observations are 
consistent with our interpretation of negative CR’s. We leave it for future research to 
investigate the negative CR cases more thoroughly.  
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Appendix A: The Conservatism Ratio (CR) 
The conservatism ratio can best be understood by reference to the time series 
properties of the earnings news measure [Equation (3)]. Perhaps the simplest example is 
to assume that the firm’s earnings, as measured by roet, follow a stationary AR(1) process 
with drift and that the firm’s expected rate of return (cost of capital) is intertemporally 
constant: 
roet = α + βroet-1 + εt       (A1) 
where the persistence parameter β is assumed to lie between 0 and 1 and is a 
zero mean error term. It is fairly straightforward to show that in this case
),0(~ 2σε t
49  
 CRt ≈ 1 - β   
In other words, the conservatism ratio (approximately) equals one minus the persistence 
of roet so that the more persistent are earnings the smaller the conservatism ratio, that is, 
the less that the earnings shock is recognized in current earnings relative to future 
earnings. This accords with intuition since a shock to an AR(1) firm will have the same 
impact on earnings each and every period over the lifetime of the firm. Moreover, the 
impact of the shock on earnings over the lifetime of the firm increases directly with the 
firm's earnings persistence. As a result, the more persistent are earnings the less of the 
shock that will be recognized in any period’s earnings.  
In the simple AR(1) example, CR varies by firm but is intertemporally constant. 
The analysis in the text allows for far more complex (and realistic) time series patterns in 
earnings and discount rates by assuming a VAR system. In the case of a VAR, the CR 
varies generally both by firm and over time. To see this consider the simple stationary 
VAR example with only two variables rt and roet: 
rt  =  α1rt-1 + α2roet-1 + η1t      (A2a) 
roet = β1rt-1 + β2roet-1 + η2t      (A2b) 
It can be shown that the conservatism ratio in this case is:50
                                                 
49 The proof is based on the definition of earnings news (Net = ∑∞= +Δ 0 jj jtt roeE ρ ). Substituting the 
AR(1) dynamic of roet  into the latter relation and noting that ΔEtroet+j = (ρβ)jεt for j ≥ 0 yields Net = εt 
/(1-ρβ). By definition CRt = εt/Net = (1-ρβ). Since ρ is very close to 1 (0.967), the result follows 
immediately. 
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Clearly, in the case of a VAR system, the conservatism ratio is generally dependent upon 
all of the parameters of the dynamics. Also, unless (i) the shocks to earnings and returns 
are always equal or (ii) the shocks to returns are always zero, or (iii) β1 = 0, the 
conservatism ratio is dependent upon the relative shocks (η1t/η2t). In particular, the 
greater the shock of earnings relative to the shock to expected returns, the greater the 
conservatism ratio. Moreover, since the shocks are time dependent so is CR. 
Straightforward observation shows that the conservatism ratio is a decreasing function of 
the earnings persistence parameter β2 and the earnings parameter α2. The relation between 
the other parameters and the conservatism ratio is ambiguous. 
 
Appendix B: Estimation of the Vuolteenaho Model  
In general, the VAR estimation is facilitated by assuming that the dynamics of the 
data are well described by a (stationary) time-series model. Specifically, define zit to be a 
vector of firm-specific state variables that follows the vector autoregressive process: 
  
zi,t = Azi,t-1 + ηi,t        (B1) 
 
Consistent with Vuolteenaho (2002), Callen and Segal (2004), and Callen, Hope, 
and Segal (2005), the VAR coefficient matrix A is assumed to be constant over time and 
over firms. The error term vectors ηi,t are vectors of shocks and are assumed to have a 
variance-covariance matrix Ω and to be independent of all variables known at t-1.  
We estimate a parsimonious VAR where the state variables consist of log stock 
returns (rt), log of one plus ROE (earnings scaled by book value of equity), and the log 
                                                                                                                                                 
50 Note that if past returns have no impact on roe so that β1 = 0 then roet is AR(1) as before and the 
conservatism ratio equals one minus the persistence of earnings (1- β2) as before. 
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book to market ratio (bmt).51 The VAR model can then be described as a system of 
(mean-adjusted) equations: 
rt = α1rt-1 + α2roet-1 + α3bmt-1 + η1t      (B2a) 
roet = β1rt-1 + β2roet-1 + β3bmt-1 + η2t      (B2b) 
bmt = δ1rt-1 + δ2roet-1 + δ3bmt-1 + η4t      (B2c) 
 
We estimate the regressions separately by industry52 (using the Fama and French 
(1997) classifications) using weighted least squares with one pooled regression per state 
variable. Each annual cross-section is weighted equally by deflating the data for each 
firm-year by the number of firms in that year.53 Consistent robust standard errors are 
obtained using the Shao-Rao (1993) jackknife method.  
As shown by Campbell (1991), the variance decomposition of these valuation 
models can be implemented empirically by combining the residuals from the VAR 
estimation with the unexpected current return valuation equation [equation (1)]. 
Formally, let eiρ = (0, ..., 1, ..., 0), where the 1 is in the i’th position. The unexpected 
change in returns is computed as: 
 
rt - Et-1(rt) = e1ρη1t         (B3) 
 
Equation (A1) implies that forecasts of the state vector zi,t can be computed as: 
 
Et[zi,t+1+j] = Aj+1zi,t         (B4) 
 
Using equation (A4), the revision in expected future returns (expected return news) is 
computed as: 
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51 The book to market ratio is included in the parsimonious VAR because our model is generated from this 
ratio. Vuolteenaho (2002) similarly includes the book to market ratio in his VAR specifications. It also 
controls for the firm’s growth prospects. 
52 Industry subscripts are suppressed in above equations. 
53 Using OLS gives similar results. 
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Similarly, the revision in expected current and future earnings (earnings news) is 
computed as:54  
1
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54 Following Vuolteenaho (2002), Callen and Segal (2004), and Callen, Hope and Segal (2005), we assume 
that ρ=0.967. The results are not sensitive to this assumption. 
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 Figure 1- The Relation between Revisions in Equity Returns and Earnings News 
Information Solely from Accounting Sources 
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Figure 1 shows the linear relation between revisions in equity returns and earnings news when 
accounting reports are the sole source of news for equity market participants. The numbers in the 
figure are obtained from Scenarios 1 and 3. Note that dollar earnings news numbers in the 
SCENARIO tables are converted to percentages in this and subsequent figures by dividing the dollar 
earnings news by beginning of period book value of equity.  Hence, the earnings news in the figure 
equals the sum of the unexpected changes in ROE as per footnote 28. 
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Figure 2- The Relation between Revisions in Equity Returns and Earnings News 
Information from Accounting and Non-Accounting Sources 
 
 
Earnings News 
4%
12%
-12%
-12%
Rt –Et-1(Rt) 
 
Figure 2 shows the nonlinear convex relation between revisions in equity returns and earnings news 
when equity market participants are privy to firm news from non-accounting sources as well as 
accounting reports. The numbers in the figure are obtained from Scenarios 1 and 4.   
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Figure 3- The Relation between Revisions in Equity Returns and Special Items 
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Figure 3 shows the nonlinear quasi-convex relation between revisions in equity returns and special 
items. The numbers in the figure are obtained from Scenarios 1 and 4. Note that we convert the 
dollar special item numbers in the SCENARIO tables to percentages by scaling special items by 
beginning of period book value of equity. By assumption, the book value of the asset is less than 
undiscounted future cash flows from -Y to the origin on the vertical axis, so that special items are 
zero (the asset is recoverable) as illustrated by Scenario 2. The 45 degree (dashed) line going through 
the origin facilitates comparison with Figure 1. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Mean Std. dev. Q1 Median Q3 
MV 1,220 7,603 36 119 520 
ROE 0.102 0.171 0.045 0.122 0.188 
BM 0.846 0.920 0.391 0.645 1.017 
RET 0.191 0.527 -0.144 0.104 0.405 
SI -0.013 0.082 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CR 0.525 0.553 0.269 0.407 0.573 
 
Notes to Table 1: 
Table 1 shows the sample distribution for selected variables where Std. Dev. is the standard 
deviation and Qi denotes the i’th quartile. MV is market value of equity in millions of dollars. 
ROE is the book return on equity computed as earnings before extraordinary items (DATA 18) 
divided by beginning of period book value of equity (DATA 60). BM is the book-to-market ratio. 
RET is the annual cum dividend return computed from monthly returns. SI is special items 
(DATA17) scaled by lagged book value of equity. CR is the conservatism measure computed as 
the earnings surprise divided by earnings news. The number of firm-year observations is 86,600 
(CR is based on 69,962 observations). 
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Table 2: VAR Estimation and News Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A: VAR Coefficient Matrix 
 RETt-1 ROEt-1 BMt-1
RETt -0.020*      (0.01) 
0.098***      
(0.017) 
0.097***     
(0.007) 
ROEt 0.064***     
(0.004) 
0.486***      
(0.021) 
-0.021***    
(0.003) 
BMt 0.112***     (0.01) 
0.196***      
(0.024) 
0.837***     
(0.008) 
 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of News Items 
  Mean Std. dev. Q1 Median Q3 
Nr 0.003 0.162 -0.090 0.005 0.101 
Ne 0.011 0.251 -0.087 0.033 0.146 
rt−Et-1(rt) 0.002 0.376 -0.229 0.009 0.239 
 
 
Panel C: Sample Correlations 
 Ne Nr rt−Et-1(rt) 
Ne 1 -0.304*** 0.690*** 
Nr -0.114*** 1 -0.765*** 
rt−Et-1(rt) 0.611*** -0.765*** 1 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
Panel D: Means of Expected Return News and Revision in Returns Ranked by 
Earnings News Quintile Portfolios 
Quintile Ne Nr rt -Et-1( rt) 
1 -0.35 0.05 -0.36 
2 -0.06 0.06 -0.16 
3 0.03 0.01 0.01 
4 0.12 -0.03 0.16 
5 0.31 -0.07 0.37 
 
Notes to Table 2 
Panel A of Table 2 lists the parameter estimates of the parsimonious VAR. We estimate the VAR 
equations by industry (Fama-French (1997) industry classification). Panel A shows the mean 
estimated parameters across industries and their standard errors in parentheses. The standard 
errors are computed using the Fama-Macbeth (1973) method. The model variables include the 
mean-adjusted cum dividend annual excess log return, rt (the first element of the state vector z); 
the mean-adjusted log of earnings normalized by prior period book values, roet (the second 
element); and the mean-adjusted log book-to-market value ratio, bmt (the third element). The 
sample size for the VAR estimation is 86,600 firm-year observations. 
 
The parameters in the table correspond to the following system: 
   zi,t= Γzi,t-1+ηi,t,   Ω= E(ηi,t,η’i,t) 
 
Panel B of Table 2 lists summary statistics of the news items as defined in Appendix B: 
Nr = Expected Return News = e1`ρΓ(I − ρΓ)−1ηi,t = λ1`ηi,t
Ne = Earnings News = e2` (I − ρΓ)−1ηi,t = λ2`ηi,t
ei` = (0, ..., 1, ..., 0), where the 1 is in the i’th position. We eliminate the top and bottom one 
percentile of the news items and the revisions in unexpected returns, rt−Et-1(rt). Thus, the panel 
and all subsequent tables are based on 82,398 observations. 
 
Panel C of Table 2 shows the correlations between Ne, Nr, and rt−Et-1(rt). The revision in 
unexpected returns is defined in Appendix B as rt−Et-1(rt)= e1`η1t. Pearson (Spearman) 
correlations are reported below (above) the diagonal. 
 
Panel D of Table 2 lists the means of Ne, Nr, and rt−Et-1(rt), all ranked by Ne portfolio quintiles. 
 
*, *** indicate significance level of 10% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 3: The Relation between Earnings News and Special Items 
 
Panel A: Means of Special Items and Earnings News (Ne) by Earnings News 
Quintiles 
Quintile N Ne SI 
1 16,480 -0.350 -0.049 
2 16,480 -0.060 -0.008 
3 16,479 0.033 -0.003 
4 16,480 0.121 0.000 
5 16,479 0.311 0.005 
 
Panel B: Regression Results of Special Items on Positive and Negative Earnings 
News  
Intercept -0.020***        
(0.004) 
D 0.059***         
(0.001) 
Ne 0.048***         
(0.002) 
D_Ne 0.121***         
(0.003) 
  
F-Value       356*** 
Adj. R2 0.15 
 
Notes to Table 3 
Panel A of Table 4 lists mean earnings news (Ne) and special items (SI) ranked by earnings news 
quintiles. Quintile 1 is the most negative Ne quintile and quintile 5 is the most positive Ne 
quintile. Panel B presents the coefficient estimates (standard errors) of the regression of SI on Ne, 
D and D_Ne. D is equal to 1 when Ne is negative and zero otherwise. D_Ne is the interaction of 
D with Ne. Ne is defined in the notes to Tables 2. The regression is estimated using firm and year 
fixed effects (not shown). *** indicates significance level of 1% level (two-sided). 
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Table 4: The Relation between Revisions in Unexpected Returns and Earnings 
News, Special Items, Current Period Earnings Shock, and Earnings.  
 
Panel A: Linear Specification 
 Ne SI CES ROE 
Intercept 0.005 -0.024*** -0.001 0.005 
 (0.010) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
rt -Et-1( rt) 0.748*** 0.078*** 0.068*** 0.070*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Nr 1.067*** 0.193*** 0.378*** 0.377*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
FNe   0.541*** 0.530*** 
   (0.003) (0.003) 
PROE    0.920*** 
    (0.003) 
Adj. R2 0.63 0.11 0.71 0.78 
 
Panel B: Nonlinear Specification 
 Ne SI CES ROE 
Intercept 0.010 -0.022*** 0.001 0.006 
 (0.010) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
D -0.005*** -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
rt -Et-1( rt) 0.728*** 0.072*** 0.062*** 0.065*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
D*(rt -Et-1( rt)) 0.029*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Nr 1.066*** 0.192*** 0.377*** 0.376*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
FNe   0.541*** 0.530*** 
   (0.003) (0.003) 
PROE    0.920*** 
    (0.003) 
Adj. R2 0.63 0.11 0.71 0.78 
 
Notes to Table 4 
Panel A of Table 4 shows the coefficient estimates (standard errors) of the earnings news (Ne), 
special items (SI), current period earning shock (CES), and earnings scaled by beginning of 
period book value of equity (ROE) regressions. FNe is the shock to future earnings (i.e., FNe = 
Ne - CES). PROE is the predicted ROE from Equation B2b. Ne, rt -Et-1( rt), and Nr are defined 
in the notes to Table 2; SI is defined in the noted to Table 1. Panel B repeats the analysis allowing 
for a nonlinear relation between the dependent variables and revisions in unexpected returns. D 
equals 1 when revision to unexpected returns [rt -Et-1( rt)] are negative (0 otherwise). The 
regressions are estimated using firm and year fixed effects (not shown). *** indicates significance 
level of 1% level (two-sided).  
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Table 5: The Relation between the Conservatism Ratio and Unexpected Revisions in 
Equity Returns  
 
Panel A: Mean (Median) Conservatism Ratio for Positive and Negative Unexpected 
Returns 
  N CR rt -Et-1( rt) 
rt -Et-1( rt)>0 37,722 
0.466       
(0.388) 
0.288      
(0.23) 
rt -Et-1( rt)<0 32,240 
0.593       
(0.439) 
-0.289      
(-0.22) 
Difference  0.127***    (0.051)***  
 
 
Panel B: Regressions of Conservatism Ratio (CR) on Proxies for Positive and 
Negative News 
 Predicted Sign (1) (2) 
Intercept ? 0.510*** 0.657*** 
  (0.041) (0.048) 
D ? 0.160*** 0.160*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) 
rt -Et-1( rt) - -0.405*** -0.405*** 
  (0.013) (0.014) 
D*(rt -Et-1( rt)) + 0.945*** 0.954*** 
  (0.020) (0.020) 
ROE ?  0.157*** 
   (0.025) 
SIZE ?  -0.025*** 
   (0.004) 
LOSS +  0.036*** 
   (0.010) 
SI -  -0.096*** 
   (0.034) 
Adj. R2  0.06 0.06 
 
Notes to Table 5 
Panel B of Table 5 shows the coefficient estimates (standard errors) of the regressions of CR on 
good and bad news (and control variables). CR is defined as the ratio of the current period 
earnings shock to total earnings news. SIZE is the log of market value of equity. LOSS is an 
indicator variable equal to one if earnings are negative (zero otherwise). All other variables are 
defined in previous tables. The regressions are estimated using firm and year fixed effects (not 
shown). *** indicates significance level of 1% level (two-sided).  
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